The Roles of Psychology in International Arbitration

Edited by
Tony Cole
CHAPTER 3

Biases and Heuristics in Arbitrator Decision-Making: Reflections on How to Counteract or Play to Them*

Edna Sussman

“Most studies of arbitration are devoted to discussions about the applicable law or the various procedural rules. It seems far more important to try to analyze how and why arbitrators make up their minds.”

Robert Coulson, President, American Arbitration Association, 1990.1

§3.01 INTRODUCTION

Mr. Coulson’s discussion of what was known at the time about psychological influences on arbitrator decision-making presaged the vigorous discussion of that subject which developed recently, some twenty years later. With the explosion of best-selling books on decision-making and the popularization of the psychological learning on the subject,2 attention has turned to its applicability to arbitrators. Presentations at meetings of the IBA,3 the Swiss Arbitration Association,4 Brunel University in

3. For a report on this session, see Allison Ross, What Goes on in Arbitrator Deliberations?, 8(2) GLOBAL ARB. REV. (April 30, 2013).
2013, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) Congress in 2014 and the Institute for Transnational Arbitration conference in 2015 have all focused on arbitral decision-making and the role of psychology.

The field of psychology is immense and the number of biases, i.e. unconscious psychological influences, identified by those that study the subject is far beyond what can be discussed in a single chapter. This chapter focuses on a few of the more significant, and offers suggestions for both arbitrators and counsel to overcome them or at least lessen their influence.

The literature which studies the psychological phenomena that are the subject of this chapter refers to them as “biases.” Because the word “bias” has such profound negative connotations in the field of arbitration and forms the basis for the extensive learning on arbitrator disclosures and challenges which are not the subject of this chapter, this chapter borrows the nomenclature used by Professor Chris Guthrie, and refers to biases as “blinders.” The biases/blinders discussed here are those that are simply human nature. While constraints imposed by the law to increase certainty and predictability, such as specifying elements for causes of action and establishing burdens of proof, are effective to some degree, ultimately decisions are made by judges and arbitrators who are human beings. Their minds function anatomically just as do the minds of others. Legal training cannot and does not alter that fundamental reality.

The human brain has both an intuitive and a deliberative component, a fact long known and now scientifically proven by the study of neuroscience. Plato, although...


8. In an earlier burst of interest, a series of papers on the subject were delivered at the ICCA Congress in 2002. See papers collected as *The Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution, International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions*, ICCA Congress Series, No. 11, London 2002 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003). But only in the last few years has concerted attention been devoted to the interface of psychology and arbitration.


10. For a discussion of standards for determining if an arbitrator is impartial and free of a bias that would provide grounds for disqualification, see Lindsay Melworm, *Biased? Prove it: Addressing Arbitrator Bias and the Merits of Implementing Broad Disclosure Standards*, 22 CARDOZO J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 431 (2014).


perhaps driving at a slightly different point, in discussing what drives people’s actions, used the image of two horses, a good horse governed by reason and a bad horse who hurries along violently and without control.\textsuperscript{13} Descartes wrote about “intuition and deduction” as the way to arrive at knowledge.\textsuperscript{14} Recently Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman popularized what he refers to as System 1 – our fast, automatic, high capacity, low effort and intuitive mode, and System 2 – our slow, deliberate, limited capacity and high-effort mode.\textsuperscript{15} His modern research-based analysis essentially posits that we cannot function without both and that human decision-making operates with System 1 making intuitive judgments, which are sometimes modified by System 2’s deliberative process. This dichotomy mirrors the two traditional models with which judging has traditionally been viewed: the “formalist” model pursuant to which it is believed that judges apply the law to the facts in a logical and deliberative way, and the “realist” model pursuant to which it is believed that judges follow their intuition to reach their judgment and later rationalize their judgment with reasoning.\textsuperscript{16}

Scholars have explored Systems 1 and 2 as they impact legal decision-making. Research has shown that, as with all human beings, the intuitive reactions of System 1 play a significant role in judges’ decision-making.\textsuperscript{17} While there is a lack of agreement as to whether there has been sufficient study of the subject to draw conclusions as to the extent to which a judge’s deliberative faculties are invoked to override the intuitive reaction,\textsuperscript{18} there is no question that System 1 is operative and impacts a judge’s

\begin{enumerate}
  \item PLATO, PHAEDRUS 34–36 (Christopher Rowe trans., 2005). In The Republic, Plato couched it differently and referred to three parts rather than two: reason, spirit and appetite, with reason seeking to control the other two. Thus, one could combine spirit and appetite to arrive at the dual model. PLATO, REPUBLIC (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford University Press 1993).
  \item Kahneman, supra note 2, at 19–105.
  \item See Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging? in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 103–120 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010), (urging that more research be done to examine whether judges diverge in deep and cognitively significant ways from other human beings in judicial decision-making lacking their training and experience). See also Christopher Drahozal, Behavior Analysis of Arbitral Decision Making, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 319–337 (Christopher Drahozal & Richard Naimark eds., 2005); Joel Cohen, BLINDFOLDS OFF: JUDGES ON HOW THEY DECIDE (American Bar Association Press 2014).
\end{enumerate}
decision-making as it does for everyone. Given the similarity of the tasks, one must conclude that arbitrators’ decision-making is similarly impacted.\textsuperscript{19}

Jurists have long recognized the power of the unconscious. As Justice Cardozo wrote almost 100 years ago, “Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.”\textsuperscript{20}

The English judges have also recognized the unconscious influence. As Lord Goff said, “[T]here is also the simple fact that bias is such an insidious thing that, even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by bias.”\textsuperscript{21}

Similarly Judge Frank, an early proponent of the realist model of judicial decision-making, wrote, “Judges are not a distinct race … And their judging must be substantially like that of other men.”\textsuperscript{22} He cautioned jurists to take note and attempt to remedy the impact of the unconscious: “The conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his biases … and by that very self-knowledge nullify their effect.”\textsuperscript{23}

US Supreme Court Justice Scalia, in his book on persuasive advocacy, advises counsel to address this aspect of the decision-making process if they wish to prevail: “While computers function solely on logic, human beings do not. All sorts of extraneous factors – emotions, biases, preferences – can intervene, most of which you can do absolutely nothing about (except play upon them, if you happen to know what they are).”\textsuperscript{24}

A growing body of scholarship has developed suggesting that one needs to look at both the intuitive and the deductive models, suggesting that “judges rely on their intuitions, but sometimes override their intuitions with deliberative decisions.” They propose an “intuitive override’ model of judicial decision making that can best be characterized as realistic formalism… [which] recognizes the power of the judicial hunch and… recognizes the importance of rule-based deliberation as a means of constraining the inevitable, but oft-times undesirable influence of intuition.”\textsuperscript{25}

It is the unconscious intuitive processes, the blinders, which are addressed in this chapter with suggestions to foster a more robust deliberative overlay and improve the quality of decisions by arbitrators. In order to provide a context that reflects actual arbitrator decision-making, I conducted a survey of arbitrators in October of 2012 (the “2012 Arbitrators Survey”). The survey, which was distributed both in the US and to

\begin{itemize}
  \item 19. Drahozal, supra note 9; see also Donald Wittman, \textit{Arbitration in the Shadow of a Jury Trial: Comparing Arbitrator and Jury Verdicts}, \textit{Dispute Resolution Journal} 59 (2003–2004) (finding that monetary outcomes did not differ significantly between arbitrators and juries in automobile accident cases).
  \item 20. \textit{Justice Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process} 107 (Quid Pro Books 2010), \textit{original publication} (Yale University Press 1921).
  \item 23. \textit{In re J.P. Linahan}, 138 F. 2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943).
\end{itemize}
colleagues around the world, drew 401 responses. The relevant survey results are reported where they illustrate and amplify the psychological influence discussed.

§3.02 UNCONSCIOUS BLINDERS

Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski, in their leading works on the subject of judicial decision-making, addressed the question of why it can be difficult to get a decision in a case right. They constructed a series of scenarios and presented them to 265 trial court judges as part of their study. They identified three sets of blinders that are the psychological influences that can lead to erroneous decisions: informational blinders, cognitive blinders and attitudinal blinders. These categorizations are useful and are adopted here.

[A] Informational Blinders: Inadmissible Evidence

1. The 2012 Arbitrators Survey

Question: Do you exclude evidence that is not admissible under the evidentiary standards you believe would be appropriate outside the arbitration forum rather than take the evidence and give it such weight as you deem appropriate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Usually (i.e., around 75% of the time)</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often (i.e., around 50% of the time)</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes (i.e., around 25% of the time)</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. The survey was disseminated by e-mail to several arbitration list serves. Of the 401 respondents, 79% were from the US, 12% were from Europe, 5% were from North America outside the US, and the remainder were from Asia, Latin America and Africa. Over 55% of the respondents had served as an arbitrator in over 50 cases while 20% had served as an arbitrator on between 21 and 50 cases. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents were male and 22% were female. Forty-two per cent were born between 1941 and 1950, 20% were born in 1940 or before and the remainder were born after 1951. While this sample may not be completely representative of the overall population of arbitrators, this survey provides a useful benchmark.

27. For results of another survey conducted with arbitrators focusing on psychological aspects, see Sophie Nappert & Dieter Flader, Psychological Factors in the Arbitral Process, in The Art of Advocacy in International Arbitration 121 (Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe, eds., 2010) (hereafter The Art of Advocacy).


29. Misjudging, supra note 11, at 420.

30. For all questions, in order to give context to the numbers, the survey defined “Usually” as around 75% of the time; “Often” as around 50% of the time and “Sometimes” as around 25%
The Empirical Studies

Study 1: To illustrate the impact of informational blinders several experiments were conducted with groups of judges in the US to ascertain whether information that was inadmissible as evidence in court impacted decision-making. In the first experiment, half of the judges saw a document claimed to be protected by attorney-client privilege which was devastating to plaintiff’s case. Seventy-five per cent of those judges ruled that the communication was privileged and excluded it. Half of the judges, who constituted the control group, did not see the document. Of the judges who did not see the document, 55% found in favor of plaintiff, while of the judges who saw the document and ruled that it was privileged, 29% found for the plaintiff.\(^{31}\)

Study 2: In the second experiment, subsequent remedial measures which are not admissible under the federal rules of evidence in the US were in issue. The case study concerned a gasoline can which flared up and caused a bad burn. The corporate defendant responded by saying that such flare ups almost never happened. Half of the judges saw a warning and recall sent by the company two years later recalling the product and warning of the possibility of flashbacks in the gasoline storage containers. The company moved to exclude the evidence as a subsequent remedial measure and the evidence was excluded. Of the judges who were exposed to the excluded evidence, 75% ruled in favor of the defendant, while 100% of the judges in the control group who did not see the recall notice found no liability.\(^{32}\)

Study 3: The third experiment concerned a prior criminal conviction. The plaintiff was injured by a piece of machinery in a products liability case. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was exaggerating his injury and introduced evidence of the plaintiff’s conviction for swindling old ladies in a scheme twelve years earlier. Eighty per cent of the judges who saw this evidence suppressed it on the grounds that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. The judges who had seen the evidence of the prior criminal conviction awarded a median damages amount of USD 400,000, while those who had not seen it awarded a median damages amount of USD 500,000.\(^{33}\)

All of these scenarios address situations in which the evidence in question was not admissible under the rules of evidence, and should not have impacted the decision on the merits. However, notwithstanding inadmissibility, the survey results demonstrate that the judges’ decisions were influenced significantly by inadmissible evidence.

Implications for Arbitration

It is not surprising that judges, and undoubtedly arbitrators, are not able to “unring the bell,” as these experiments demonstrate. However, formal rules of evidence are...
generally not applied in arbitration. For example, the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence\textsuperscript{34} (the “IBA Rules”), the leading persuasive authority on the use of evidence in arbitration, provide some guidance, but in leaving it to the arbitrator to determine the “admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence,”\textsuperscript{35} they are a far cry from imposing standards of admissibility similar to formal rules of evidence.

Concerned principally about making sure that the parties have a full and fair opportunity to present their case and mindful of the time and cost that would be incurred if formal rules of evidence were to be applied, arbitrators tend to allow evidence that would be inadmissible in a court proceeding. The Arbitrators Survey results revealed that 33% of the arbitrator respondents never excluded evidence and 55% excluded evidence only about 25% of the time. Thus 88% of arbitrators admit evidence even though it is inadmissible under evidentiary standards at least 75% of the time and 34% never exclude it. Only 1% of the arbitrators always exclude such evidence.

In light of these findings, should arbitrators be more willing to exclude evidence that does not meet evidentiary standards? Should arbitrators be more careful to ensure that they are not giving undue weight to unreliable evidence that enters the record? What does it mean when arbitrators say they will give evidence as to which an objection is lodged the “weight it deserves”? What can arbitrators do to try to overcome this blinder?

Concerns about protecting the award and forestalling the creation of grounds for challenge, which even if without merit prolong resolution of the dispute and cause parties to incur significant expense, understandably cause arbitrators to act as the survey indicated. Moreover, studies have shown that parties are more likely to accept and honor a decision if they perceive the process to have been fair; the admission of evidence they offer and acceptance of their “voice” in the tribunal’s proceedings enhances their perception of procedural justice, even if ultimately that evidence is not influential.\textsuperscript{36} Given the increasing proclivity of parties to challenge awards, arbitrators’ practice of generally admitting evidence serves important objectives.

But arbitrators should take care to try to counter this blinder. First and foremost, arbitrators should really do what they say they will do and consciously weigh the reliability of evidence they have promised to assess as to weight. In addition, reviewing preliminary conclusions of the case to see if the outcome would differ if unreliable evidence admitted on that basis had not been introduced may serve as a check by showing the arbitrators the extent to which such pieces of evidence have influenced their thinking.

A special situation presents itself when the tribunal is asked to review documents to determine a privilege objection. If the determination cannot be made without a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} International Bar Association, \textit{Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration} (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid. at Art. 9(1).
\end{itemize}
review of the documents and a demand is made for such a review, should the tribunal perform that task itself knowing that it may be influenced by what it sees? Article 3(8) of the IBA Rules provides a desirable solution, allowing that in exceptional circumstances the tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, appoint an independent and impartial expert to conduct the review. While the appointment of such an independent expert may cost time and money, in light of the danger of prejudice, if a party asks for such an independent review, careful consideration should be given to all of the relevant factors before deciding on the tribunal’s response.

A similar issue arises with respect to expert testimony. Arbitrators frequently accept experts who might not qualify to testify as to the subject of their testimony if they were presented in court and arbitrators often permit experts to stray from their area of expertise to offer additional opinions. Should arbitrators be so lax in admitting expert testimony? At the very least arbitrators should be aware of the psychological influence such testimony may have on their thinking and carefully assess the credentials of the experts in determining the weight to be given.

For their part, should counsel point out the inadmissibility and unreliability of evidence, if appropriate, more than is now common in order to highlight the matter for the tribunal? Or, as studies have shown with juries who remember the evidence that was excluded even more vividly than the evidence that was admitted, do counsel risk exacerbating the problem by focusing the arbitrators on the problematic document or testimony? Should counsel do more to focus the tribunal’s attention on the lack of expertise of a proffered expert?

Counsel should carefully weigh the pros and cons in considering their alternatives. While no one would argue for turning an arbitration into a courtroom-style debate about the admissibility of every piece of evidence, a brief, one-word objection on critical pieces of evidence as to which a valid evidentiary objection can be lodged may be advisable in some circumstances. If there are many such pieces of evidence that are important, it may be advisable to offer evidentiary objections to the tribunal in a succinct filing. Such assistance by counsel may cause the tribunal to more carefully assess the reliability of such evidence.

The empirical evidence suggests that arbitrators, like judges, will be influenced by all the evidence they receive, even evidence that would be deemed inadmissible evidence in a courtroom. However, careful attention to this influence by both arbitrators and counsel, and the adoption of procedures such as those described above to minimize the influence, can reduce the risk.

37. Courts recognize the prejudice that may result from an in camera review of documents as to which privilege is asserted because it “may be difficult to ‘unring the bell.’” See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 307 (D. Col. 2009).
Cognitive blinders are patterns of deviation in judgment which can lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment or illogical interpretation. They include heuristics, which are mental shortcuts that permit people to solve problems, make judgments and react to situations quickly and efficiently. These rule-of-thumb strategies shorten decision-making time and allow people to function without constantly stopping to think about the next course of action.

**Hindsight Blinder**

The very nature of arbitration calls for an evaluation of events after the fact, thus making the process particularly vulnerable to the hindsight blinder. Hindsight has been described as the "most troublesome problem for judges." Arbitrators understand this difficulty and often speak of the need to avoid being influenced by hindsight, but do they adequately appreciate the difficulty of putting aside what ultimately occurred in deciding what happened or should have happened in the past? Judicial decisions such
as those relating to stock values and predictions of the market have been laid by some scholars at the feet of hindsight.\footnote{42}{Gulati, Rachlinski & Langevoort, \textit{supra} note 41.}

The burden of proof may in some instances be of assistance in countering hindsight.\footnote{43}{Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, \textit{A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight}, 65 U. Chi. L Rev. 571, 615–616 (1998).} If one isolates and lists the facts that were proven as of the relevant time frame from later biasing events and applies the burden of proof just to the earlier facts, it might assist in minimizing the impact of hindsight. In addition, counsel may wish to emphasize precisely which facts in the record are properly presented on an issue and stress that it is based on those facts alone that the tribunal must rule with reference to the burden of proof. The recent focus on and discussion of the need for greater precision in the analysis of the burden of proof and standard of proof\footnote{44}{Jennifer Smith & Sara Nadeau-Seguin, \textit{The Illusive Standard of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration}, ICCA No. 18, \textit{supra} note 6, at 134–155.} coupled with the empirical evidence that demonstrated that the burden of proof is often outcome determinative\footnote{45}{Arbitration and Decision Making, ICCA No 18, \textit{supra} note 6, at 63.} suggests that such an approach could be effective.

\section*{[2] Anchoring Blinder}

\subsection*{[a] The 2012 Arbitrator Survey}

Which do you find more difficult to decide: liability or quantum of damages?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liability</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damages</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both the same</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\subsection*{[b] The Empirical Studies}

\textit{Study 1}: The first case involved an auto accident which resulted in an amputated arm. The same facts were presented to all of the judges but some judges heard a demand of USD 10 million in a settlement conference while the control group heard a demand for “a lot of money.” The judges who heard the USD 10,000,000 demand awarded a mean of USD 2,210,000 while the judges who only heard a large number awarded a mean of USD 808,000.\footnote{46}{Inadmissible Information, \textit{supra} note 28, at 1288–1291.}

\textit{Study 2}: The second dispute presented to the judges involved a pedestrian hit by a truck who was badly injured. He must now use a wheel chair and was seeking lost wages and damages for pain and suffering. The braking system on the truck was faulty. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to meet the court’s USD 75,000 jurisdictional minimum. All but two judges who heard that motion denied it. The judges in the
control group did not hear the motion. The judges who did not hear the motion awarded a mean of USD 1,200,000 million. The judges who heard the motion awarded a mean of USD 880,000.47

Study 3: The subjects were asked to guess the average temperature of San Francisco. The anchor group was first asked whether the temperature was higher or lower than 558°F or 292°C. After answering this question, the anchor group was asked to give a number estimating San Francisco’s average temperature. The anchor group provided higher estimates of average temperature than the control group. They had latched on to the initial high, although obviously irrelevant, figures they had heard before the final question was posed to them.48

Study after study has demonstrated the strong influence of the anchoring effect. Numbers, including completely irrelevant numbers, or numbers which cannot be rationally justified, unconsciously move the decision maker’s thinking in the direction of that number.

[c] Implications for Arbitration

Arbitrators may question whether the anchoring studies cited are of any significance to their practice since most of their cases involve commercial or financial disputes in which there is no element of damages as discretionary as a determination of the value of an amputated arm or of pain and suffering, and in which considerable evidence of damages is offered. But there is often considerable room for differences of opinion in determining which damages calculation to believe, which expert is credible, and what aspects of the damages analysis should be adopted. Numbers are suggestive, and high or low numbers, even those that are presented at the start of the arbitration, can impact an arbitrator’s thinking despite the careful damages analysis conducted based on the concrete evidence presented by the parties. Study after study has proven that people will be anchored in their response by numbers that bear no relationship to the question they are asked to answer and will adjust from it.

In the context of a three-arbitrator tribunal, then, where it appears that one arbitrator is leaning heavily in one direction and has in mind a damages figure that does not seem to comport with the evidence, the chair might want to consider having all suggest a damages figure so that all views are heard before any arbitrator gets locked into a particular way of viewing the case. Such an introduction of all of the arbitrators’ numbers may deflect the anchoring bias as the deliberations proceed.

As the Arbitrator Survey results demonstrate, many arbitrators find that quantifying damages is often more difficult than determining liability. There is often no clear right answer, perhaps opening the door for the influence of the anchoring blinder. Being mindful of the anchoring blinder should assist arbitrators to avoid falling prey to it. Counsel should carefully weigh in each case, based on its particular circumstances, whether they are better served offering a number that is very high or very low in the

47. Misjudging, supra note 11, at 43.
hopethatitwillinfluencethe arbitrator to unconsciously react with the anchoring bias, or whether in doing so they will lose all credibility and would be better served by presenting a number that is credible, and supporting it in such a convincing fashion that they will overcome any anchoring blinder.

[3] Framing Blinder

[a] The Empirical Studies

Study 1: In this experiment the same two sets of adjectives in a different order were used to describe two people.

Alan: intelligent-industrious-impulsive-critical-stubborn-envious
Ben: envious-stubborn-critical-impulsive-industrious-intelligent

The study found that the initial adjective colored the subjects assessment of the later adjectives, leading the experiment subjects to view Alan as an able person with some shortcomings and Ben as a problem person whose abilities are hampered by serious difficulties.59

Study 2: The subjects were all shown the same film. Then they were asked how fast the cars were going using different words to describe the moment of contact. The responses varied depending on the word used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smashed</td>
<td>40 MPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collided</td>
<td>39 MPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumped</td>
<td>38 MPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit</td>
<td>34 MPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted</td>
<td>31 MPH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Words and sequence count. These studies demonstrate that the words chosen to present the facts and the order of presentation of the facts can make a significant difference in how a case is decided.

[b] Implications for Arbitration

Every arbitration counsel knows that how the story is presented is crucial to persuading the tribunal to accept their version of the case. The words that are chosen to express the story, the elements of the story that are emphasized, the order and manner in which parts of the story are presented, are essential elements in persuasive advocacy. Arbitrators in turn are conscious of the fact that differences in the quality of the lawyering can affect their decision. Without overstepping and assisting counsel in

49. Inadmissible Information, supra note 28, at 1266.
inappropriate ways, arbitrators do try to look beyond the manner and style of presentations to ascertain the true story. Arbitrators should isolate the facts in their own thinking in order to step back from the influence a better framed story might have on them. Again, recognition of the psychological influence that a well-crafted presentation can have should serve to heighten an arbitrator’s ability to improve his or her decision-making. Counsel, of course, should use their skills to the best of their ability and present their story in the most favorable light and in a manner most likely to have the psychological impact they desire.

[4] **Coherence and Ego-Centricity Blinders**

[a] **The 2012 Arbitrator Survey**

On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the most certain, how certain are you that you have reached the correct result by the time you sign the award?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[b] **Empirical Studies**

*Study 1*: Judges were asked to estimate their reversal rate on appeal by stating what quartile they would fall into as compared to other judges, with the top quartile being the one with the highest reversal rate. Fifty-six per cent put themselves in the lowest quartile and 31% in the second lowest quartile. Thus, 87% of the judges thought at least half their peers had higher reversal records on appeal.\(^51\)

As these studies demonstrate, arbitrators and judges are very confident, perhaps over-confident, in the correctness of their decisions. As Judge Posner, one of the most highly regarded American jurists, summed it up well, “the psychology of judging includes the belief that one is almost always (some judges think always) right.”\(^52\)

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Implications for Arbitration

The coherence blinder is the psychological model which examines the shift from conflict to closure. During the course of deciding a case the judge’s or arbitrator’s view of the dispute gradually moves towards a state of coherence so that the arguments that support one result are endorsed and the opposing arguments are rejected. By the end of this process one view of the case emerges as the winning position.53

Justice Cardozo explained the process most eloquently:

Then suddenly the fog has lifted. I have reached a stage of mental peace. I know in a vague way that there is doubt whether my conclusion is right. I must needs admit the doubt in view of the travail that I suffered before landing at the haven. I cannot quarrel with anyone who refuses to go along with me; and yet, for me, however it may be for others, the judgment reached with so much pain has become the only possible conclusion, the antecedent doubts merged, and finally extinguished, in the calmness of conviction.54

Once the state of coherence is reached, certainty, a state the mind strives for, takes hold. Jurists have long commented on the human inclination to reach a state of certainty which leads to conviction as to the accuracy of conclusions reached. As Judge Posner remarked: “People hate being in a state of doubt and will do whatever is necessary to move from doubt to belief.”55 Justice Holmes, similarly stated, “[t]he language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and repose which is in every human mind.”56

Robert Burton in his book on the subject discussed this phenomenon of reaching certainty in physical terms with reference to the brain’s mesolimbic dopamine system which provides feelings of pleasure.57

Judges have used the concept of the hunch to explain their arrival at a decision. Judge Hutcheson, who was undergoing Freudian psychoanalysis, originated the concept in an early work: “after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and ... sheds its light along the way.”58 Judge Friendly spoke of the decisional conclusion as “flashes before the shaving mirror in the morning” which he attributes to trained intuition.59

But the question must be asked, does feeling certain upon reaching a state of coherence provide assurance that the result reached is correct or is this really just overconfidence leading to the “illusion of validity.” Overconfidence may lead to premature conclusions and insufficient consideration of alternative possibilities, thus decreasing judgment accuracy. Is the certainty with which a conclusion is reached also the natural result of yet another blinder, the confirmation blinder?

Recognition of this phenomenon should cause arbitrators to force themselves to move more slowly towards their conclusion. The “open mind” that arbitrators state they have until the conclusion of all of the presentations of both the facts and law should truly stay open. A reexamination of all of the factors that led to the decision, both on the fact and law, to counter a premature feeling of certainty or the influence of a “hunch” should assist in ensuring that the correct result is really reached.

[5] Confirmation Blinder

[a] 2012 Arbitrator Survey

Do you form a preliminary view of the merits of the case after receiving the prehearing submissions?

| Always | 3.5% |
| Usually | 14.1% |
| Often | 19.4% |
| Sometimes | 50.5% |
| Never | 12.4% |

In what percentage of your cases have you changed your mind and rendered an award that is at variance with your prehearing preliminary view if formed?

| 0%–10% | 9.9% |
| 11%–20% | 20.3% |
| 21%–30% | 31.3% |
| 31%–40% | 16.6% |
| 41%–50% | 18.9% |
| Over 50% | 8% |

In approximately what percentage of your cases have you changed your view of the case outcome while writing the award?

60. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2(2) REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 175, 188 (1998).
Which of the following practices do you believe is better?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share views early in the process and discuss reactions to the merits</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>throughout the proceeding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait until all the evidence is in before discussions among the arbitrators</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>about the merits of the case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[b] Empirical Studies

Study 1: Subjects identified as proponents of capital punishment said the evidence reinforced their prior beliefs, while subject identified as opponents of capital punishment said that the same information reinforced their prior beliefs.62

Study 2: Although law students were given identical factual information, the ones who were told that they represented the plaintiff interpreted the facts as being favorable to the plaintiff while the other group told that they represented the defendant found the facts to be favorable to the defendant.63

Study 3: A series of studies demonstrated that when a person draws a conclusion on the basis of information acquired and integrated over time, the information acquired early in the process is likely to carry more weight than that acquired later, the so-called primacy effect. People often form an opinion early in the process and then evaluate subsequently acquired information in a way that is partial to that opinion.64

[c] Implications for Arbitration

In the context of arbitral decision-making the confirmation blinder is a particularly pernicious blinder. All arbitrators say that they keep “an open mind” until the close of the hearing and surely arbitrators honestly believe that to be true. However, the psychological learning suggests this to be a blinder in and of itself.

64. See studies discussed in Nickerson, supra note 60 at 187.
Francis Bacon stated hundreds of years ago, “The first conclusion colors and brings into conformity with itself all that comes after.” A similar conclusion was reached by Waites and Lawrence, both lawyers and social psychologists known for their courtroom decision-making work, who concluded in their foremost article on the subject of psychology and arbitrators that:

A typical arbitrator concludes the initial phase with a single dominant story in mind... [a] sizeable percentage of arbitrators have established a clear leaning by the end of the opening statement (prior to any exposure to witnesses or evidence). This would mean that for most arbitrators, the actual arbitration presentation is a process of filtering through the evidence to test their individual hypothesis about the case—to either confirm or to alter their original notion of what the case story really is.... Arbitrators will make every effort to fit their perceptions of the facts and circumstances of the case into the story they have formed... Once a narrative has become firmly visualized, arbitrators will rarely change their opinions about what happened although they will occasionally change their minds about how the events in the case should be legally classified.

The 2012 Arbitrator Survey results are instructive. Eighty-eight per cent of the arbitrators formed a preliminary view of the merits of the case at least 25% of the time after only receiving the prehearing submissions, while 37% formed such views at least 50% of the time. Sixty per cent of the arbitrators changed their preliminary determination 30% or less of the time. And still, 28.4% changed their minds while writing the award 11%–20% of the time while 10.1% did so 21%–35% of the time. These results suggest that arbitrators do review the case as it progresses and are not necessarily as locked into their preliminary view as the confirmation blinder would suggest. The deliberative functions do appear to be operating and the confirmation blinder may not be as strong an influence on arbitrators as some of the other blinders.

Recently leading practitioners have suggested earlier focused exchanges of views by the arbitrators. Neil Kaplan has proposed the Kaplan Opening calling for an oral presentation of the case by counsel after the first round of written submissions and witness statements but well before the hearing, and including perhaps even some expert testimony. Lucy Reed has proposed the Reed Retreat for complex disputes. This contemplates a time be scheduled in the procedural timetable for the tribunal to meet in person to study the file well in advance of the hearing, with the goal of arriving together at targeted directions to the parties for the hearing. Increasing attention is being given to the Germanic approach to see if there are lessons to be learned from that practice. The German arbitrator’s approach, following the practice of the German courts, calls for identifying the legal issues, establishing the burden and standard of proof, categorizing the facts that support each side’s position, and streamlining the

65. Francis Bacon, Novum organum, XLVI, (1620).
67. See e.g., remarks by David Rivkin in Inside the Black Box: How Tribunals Operate and Reach Decisions, ASA Special Series No. 42, 21–25 (2014).
68. Neil Kaplan, If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Change It, 80 ARB. ISSUE 2, 172–175 (2014).
69. Reed, supra note 9, at 95–96.
presentation of the evidence for the hearing to the material disputed facts. Furthermore, preliminary views may be given if the parties agree even before the hearing.\footnote{Klaus Peter Berger, The International Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction—A German Perspective, 25(2) Arb. INTL. 217–238 (2009); Jan K. Schäfer, Focusing a Dispute on the Dispositive Legal and Factual Issues, or How German Arbitrators Think—An Introduction to a Traditional German Method, b-Arbitra 2, 333–334 (2013).}

These measures are to be commended as offering the possibility of significant improvements to the arbitration process by ensuring well prepared arbitrators, providing guidance to the parties and narrowing the issues to be presented at the hearing. But arbitrators must be diligent to counter the confirmation blinder, especially if arbitrators engage in more in-depth shared analyses and discussions of the case earlier in the process. Will it increasingly be the case in too many arbitrations that a conclusion reached early is substantiated by later evidence as conflicting evidence is filtered out by the arbitrator’s unconscious?

The law has recognized the impact of confirmation bias in the context of jury trials in the US. Jurors are admonished to keep an open mind during the presentation of evidence and to form no conclusions until all the evidence has been presented and they have been instructed by the judge. The jurors are instructed not to talk about the case with one another until the judge sends them to commence the deliberation process. Studies conducted with mock jurors suggest that such admonitions alone are insufficient to accomplish their purpose, and that jurors often come to favor a particular verdict early in the trial process and deliver final verdicts consistent with their tentative conclusions.\footnote{Nickerson, \textit{supra} note 60 at 193–194.}

It is likely that the 27\% of arbitrators who the survey showed follow a similar protocol and wait until the conclusion of the evidence before talking to their fellow arbitrators about their reactions likely do so for the same reasons as the instructions to the juries: to avoid reaching decisions too early. But it is also likely that, like the findings of juries, this practice does not achieve its goal of forestalling a premature conclusion. Thus the 63\% of arbitrators who believe that it is a best practice to share views early in the process and discuss reactions to the testimony and the developing merits throughout the proceeding are likely not, in fact, prejudicing a fair result. And many arbitrators would feel that many of the benefits of having three decision makers would be lost if views and reactions could not be exchanged and debated during the course of the proceeding, and that in the absence of such exchanges, they would lose the opportunity to guide the arbitration process and focus counsel on the matters which the arbitrators feel must be addressed.

However, how those conversations are conducted can have a significant impact on whether or not the confirmation bias that is human nature is ameliorated. There are practices that can be followed by the arbitrators in the course of their discussions in a conscious effort to truly keep an open mind and forestall the impact of the confirmation blinder and ensure that all aspects of the case are being fully considered throughout.

Making sure that both “stories” are played for discussion throughout the proceeding would help. Many believe the role of the party-appointed arbitrator is to make
sure the position asserted by his or her appointing party is understood. This can be viewed as a virtue as it may serve to forestall the confirmation blinder in that all arbitrators hear all sides throughout the process. But, it does pose the risk of a party-appointed arbitrator becoming increasingly convinced of his appointing party’s position as the confirmation blinder strengthens.

To defuse this blinder and perhaps even counter to some extent any unconscious predisposition towards the position of the appointing party, consider whether it would be useful, in particular cases where an arbitrator seems unduly wedded to one view, to have the party-appointed arbitrators sum up the evidence each day over lunch, but have them switch which side’s evidence they are marshaling from time to time. Any party-appointed arbitrator that does not perform this function in good faith and marshal the evidence competently will lose credibility in the tribunal.

If there are no party-appointed arbitrators, consider having the co-arbitrators develop the story from each party’s perspective and marshal the evidence that supports each party’s case continuously throughout the proceeding. It may also be helpful to have them switch sides from time to time so they do not develop a confirmation blinder in favor of the side they are presenting.

Whether such a process would lead to more dissents is a question that might be asked. The fact that there are very few dissents in commercial cases even where there are party-appointed arbitrators suggests that the risk is slim. In any case, it should be trumped by the importance of fairly hearing all sides of the case.

§3.03 ATTITUDINAL BLINDERS: BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

Arbitrators like all people have their own cultural and legal backgrounds and their own experiences and predilections which they bring to the arbitration. These predispositions form attitudinal blinders which can influence decision-making.

[A] Empirical Studies

Study 1: In a striking study researchers worked with staunch supporters of candidates Bush and Kerry in the 2004 US presidential elections. Statements by the candidates were played for them while they were connected to a magnetic imaging device that measured the location and level of brain activity. The study demonstrated that only the intuitive parts of the brain (System 1) were triggered; the reasoning part (System 2) remained completely inactive as any negative information about their candidate was simply filtered out automatically. The same result was found when they played positive messages about the opposing candidates. The information never reached the deliberative part of the brain.72

Study 2: In an experiment conducted with arbitrators, twenty different panels of arbitrators listened to a tape of the same contract dispute. All were arbitrators, but half were brokers and half were manufacturers. The dispute concerned a sale of goods contract and the issue was whether or not the defendant broker had the right to cancel the contract. The comparison between the manufacturer arbitrators and broker arbitrators demonstrated that the brokers were far more likely to favor decisions for the broker defendant than were the manufacturers.73

As these studies demonstrate attitudinal predilections may actually unconsciously close the mind to anything at variance with an already held belief or tilt the decision towards a sympathetic outcome for an affinity group.

[B] Implications for Arbitration

Arbitrators are people and like all people have their own frames of reference, experiences and societal inputs that guide their thinking and their decision-making processes. Each arbitrator is uniquely influenced by his or her lifetime experiences and cultural influences and like a judge is influenced by that background. The legal culture in which an arbitrator is schooled and practices can have a significant impact not only on the procedures the arbitrator adopts to conduct the arbitration74 but perhaps even more significantly, on how he or she interprets the legal principles applicable regardless of the party’s choice of law.

As Justice Holmes said:

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.75

His comment was echoed by Justice Cardozo who said, “If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge, just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself.”76 The English judges similarly acknowledge that a judge’s individual circumstances can predispose a judge. As Lord Phillips noted, “Bias can come in many forms. It may consist of irrational prejudice or it may arise from

75. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ’ns 1991) (originally published 1881); see also, RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (discussion of political and personal elements in judging). See also, Ellen Braman, LAW POLITICS & PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (University of Virginia Press 2009).
76. CARDozo, supra note 20, at 71.
particular circumstances which, for logical reasons, predispose a judge toward a particular view of the evidence or issue before him.”

The influence of life’s experience is best exemplified by Justice Stewart’s words in a landmark obscenity case. In deciding that the offending item was not obscene, Justice Stewart summed up the basis for his conclusion, “I know it when I see it.”

Speaking of this aspect of human nature in the context of arbitrator decision-making, Shari Diamond referenced three psychological influences at the 2002 ICCA Congress. The “affinity effect” occurs when “decision-makers are influenced by their cultural backgrounds, their prior experiences, and their personal associations in formulating their understanding of and judging the behavior they must consider in reaching their decisions.” The “self-serving or egocentric bias” is the “tendency for people to reach judgments that are biased in a self-serving direction.” And, finally, the “expectancy effect” causes “beliefs about the world and preconceived notions about the likely credibility of particular types of witnesses [to] affect how decision-makers evaluate evidence” and causes decision makers to be more “likely to reject information that is inconsistent with their beliefs and expectations.” Yet, people feel that they are free of prejudice or bias, the illusion of objectivity.

§3.04 IMPROVING ARBITRATOR DECISION-MAKING

Arbitrators can minimize the impact of cultural differences by acquainting themselves with the presentation and speaking styles of the culture of the witnesses appearing before them. While arbitrators are often selected because of their backgrounds and experience, arbitrators should take care to assess the case that is actually presented before them, and to consciously endeavor to overcome any affinity they might have for any of the parties as a result of their background. Counsel should take care in the selection of arbitrators to appoint arbitrators accustomed to assessing witnesses from different cultural backgrounds and who have a reputation for independence and impartiality in their decision-making.

A great deal has been written about how a reasoned award should be written and what is required to satisfy the requirements of a reasoned award but further attention should also be given to the process of reaching a decision on the merits and avoiding blinders in the process. Psychological studies conclude that simply understanding the need to avoid blinders and the desire to overcome one’s blinders and to correct them is not sufficient to cure the problem. Awareness of the mental contaminant and

77. Re Medicaments & Related Classes of Goods (No. 2), 2001 WLR 700, 711, para. 37.
80. Ibid. at 337.
81. Ibid. at 337–338.
motivation to correct it has been found not to lead to control. Human nature and the workings of the brain are such that even if people know they have blinders and understand that they have predispositions, they do not believe those blinders infect their judgment. Indeed, they recognize that the judgment of others is affected by blinders, but remain convinced that they themselves are unaffected. This has been labeled as the “bias blind spot.”

While there is strong support in the psychological literature for the bias blind spot conclusion, other psychologists argue, based on a different set of studies, that people will view information more objectively and rely less on intuitive reactions if they are motivated. Speaking about judges, they describe this as “bottom-up” decision-making (matching the formalist perspective on judicial decision-making) and conclude that it can be motivated by a fear of invalidity, a feeling of accountability for decisions taken, and/or a desire to be accurate. They report that given sufficient time availability, such motivations will lead to a more deliberative process. Surely all of these motivations are applicable to arbitrators who care deeply about making the right decision and feel a strong personal sense of responsibility to the parties and to the other members of the tribunal to whom they are accountable.

While humans cannot function without the operation of the intuitive part of the brain and it certainly has a role to play in all arbitrator functions, arbitrators owe it to the parties to take whatever steps they believe would be effective to counter their unconscious blinders and prompt the deliberative portion of the brain to engage fully in the assessment of all aspects of the case. The psychological research on debiasing techniques is far less advanced than the research that identifies biases. However, some work has been done and the following suggestions are offered to arbitrators to assist in assuring the active engagement of the brain’s deliberative faculties and hopefully the reduction of the influence of unconscious blinders. Many arbitrators already take some of these steps, and the 2012 Arbitrator Survey suggests that many perform well in applying their deliberative functions to the decision-making process, but there is value in developing a list and reviewing it for applicability and action to further counter psychological blinders:

85. Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Linn & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28(3) PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002). The truth of this conclusion was confirmed in my own personal experience. I gave a talk on this subject at an arbitration conference and asked one of my esteemed colleagues during the break what he thought of the presentation. He said that the presentation was all about judges and we are arbitrators. The clear implication of his reaction was that somehow we arbitrators are different and not subject to the same biases and blinders as judges.
As you consider your decision and as you write the award consider the opposite side, assuming each to be correct. Identify why you may be wrong, what are the important pieces of evidence that go the other way and why are they not reliable or credible. Consult your co-arbitrators and review all aspects of the facts and law and conclusions with them. Make sure you elicit the independent thinking of each member of the tribunal. Create a checklist with columns for each party and list the facts that favor that party. Create a checklist listing the legal claims and the elements of each claim and review how and whether they have been met, looking at it from each side’s perspective. Reduce your reliance on memory; look for record citations for all of the important facts for both sides to ensure that you have recalled them correctly. Replay how you reached your conclusion and think about what evidence you rejected and why, in reaching that conclusion. Write down your reasoning, even if you are issuing a bare award at the request of the parties. Estimate the odds of being wrong. If you conclude they are too high, rethink the case until you are more certain of your conclusion. Try to identify any significant evidence that would be inadmissible or is unreliable that may have influenced you and consider the outcome without that evidence.

89. Ronkainen, supra note 17, at 12.
97. See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 87, at 395.
Focus especially on the blinders that have been shown to affect judicial decision makers, such as the anchoring and hindsight blinders, and affirmatively and consciously consider whether you may have been influenced by them.

Do not take too many cases. Make sure you leave enough time to think through all of the issues, both factual and legal. 98

Leave time to sleep on the award so that you can continue to think about it and then go back and review it with fresh eyes. 99

Consider what evidence you would have needed presented to you in order to come to the opposite conclusion, and consider whether in fact such evidence was presented.

Ask yourself what the losing party would feel that you overlooked in your analysis.

Consider, if somebody were to have concluded the other way, how would he or she write the award and where and how would it differ. 100

Stay informed as the study of arbitral decision-making and psychology develops to learn more about blinders and improve your practices. 101

The 2012 Arbitrator Survey results described in this chapter provide some perspectives on current practices with respect to a few of these steps. A follow-up survey could review whether the specific suggestions listed are in fact part of arbitrators’ current practice.

Question: Do you review the evidentiary record before you prepare the award?

Response:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

98. See Bartels, supra note 86, at 46; see also Steven L. Neuberg, T. Nicole Judice & Stephen G. West, What the Need for Closure Scale Measures and What It Does Not: Toward Differentiating Among Related Epistemic Motives, 72(6) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1396, 1396–1397 (1997) (citing studies that showed that when a person is motivated by a desire for closure activated by time pressures they are likely to exhibit the impact of the primacy effect (persuaded by what was presented first), make stereotypical judgments, assimilate new information to existing active beliefs and, in the presence of prior information, resist persuasion.).


100. Lord et al., supra note 88, at 1240.

101. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 87, at 393.
Question: When you deliberate as a panel, how often do you review the evidence in favor of what you have preliminarily assessed to be the losing side?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on these survey results, it appears arbitrators can do more to counter their blinders. As reported, 46% of arbitrators review the evidence that supported what was preliminarily viewed to be the losing side when deliberating 50% or less of the time. And it is not clear if the arbitrators’ responses as to their own review of evidence referred to looking for citations to support a conclusion or a review of evidence that supports both sides. As arbitrators learn more about the blinders that affect their thinking, best practices to foster a more engaged deliberative process is likely to evolve to improve the quality of decision-making.

§3.05 ADVICE FOR ARBITRATION COUNSEL

It is common wisdom that one of the most important, if not the most important step, in the arbitration for a party is the selection of the arbitrator. Because arbitrators are not all the same and, as discussed above, their decisions may be greatly influenced by their background and experience, many have argued that the party-appointed system for arbitrator selection is a sine qua non if arbitration is to prosper. Parties wish to have one arbitrator with whom they feel comfortable and to whom they feel they can craft a presentation that will appeal. It has not been established that only the party-appointed system, which has been both severely criticized and roundly defended by leading scholars in recent years, is the only way to identify arbitrators that the parties would trust. But, as the discussion above makes clear, arbitrator selection is a critical part of the arbitration from the party’s perspective and will perhaps draw even more attention as the psychology of decision-making becomes better known.

Many sources offering guidance for effective advocacy have been published. Such tips as reading everything a prospective arbitrator has written, developing an appealing “story,” tailoring the manner and substance of the presentation to appeal to


103. See, e.g., discussions in The Art of Advocacy, supra note 27.
the specific arbitrators, are all practices which are, in fact, designed to understand and/or play to the unconscious of the arbitrator.

To the wealth of literature on the subject, consider one additional thought and two additional approaches for counsel addressed specifically to uncovering and addressing or deflecting unconscious blinders.

[A] How Many Arbitrators

If the size of the case warrants it and the accuracy of the decision is paramount, consideration should be given to having three arbitrators rather than one. There are many issues to consider in deciding how many arbitrators to suggest, time and cost among them. But the suggestion in the literature that “group decision-makers might be better equipped to combat some of the more pernicious cognitive blinders like hindsight bias” should not be ignored. Groups can remember more facts than individuals and in deliberating with one another can share remembered information leading to a more accurate determination. Beyond recollection and focus on different facts, three arbitrators bring different backgrounds and experiences to the arbitration and bring to the deliberations “differing insights and views of the events and motivations” which “provide the group with a more complete perspective out of which a better quality decision can be made.”

[B] Tapping the Social Scientists

Jury consultants have long been employed in the US as a response to the importance of selection and messaging in winning cases. Users of jury consultants find them useful and their widespread use is a testament to their utility. The arbitration community is just beginning to explore the arbitrator’s psychology. In cases that warrant such an additional expenditure, utilizing the services of social scientists to assist with an understanding of the psychological dimensions may be useful.

Waites and Lawrence concluded in the foremost article on the subject of psychology and arbitrators that, like the mock jury used to prepare for a jury trial, “the most useful scientific tool we have in preparing for an arbitration hearing is a mock arbitration panel study … Many, if not most, of the perceptions of the mock arbitrators will be close enough to those of the actual arbitration panel that the data will be valuable in developing recommendations for themes, case story, and other aspects of the actual presentation.”

105. Misjudging, supra note 11, at 452–453.
106. Waites & Lawrence, supra note 66, at 115.
108. Waites & Lawrence, supra note 66, at 118–119.
Social scientists can be helpful from the beginning of the process with the selection of the arbitrators, just as they currently vet jury prospects and assist in jury selection. They may bring an understanding of human nature and ability to discern likely reactions which can be a useful additional input into the process of considering prospective arbitrators. With the globalization of commerce and the increased participation of arbitrators from many different cultures, such input may be particularly useful.\textsuperscript{109}

Social scientists can also assist in developing the presentation of the case, as they now do for both juries and judges.\textsuperscript{110} Many practitioners test their arguments or presentations with colleagues at the firm or with an arbitrator hired as a consultant to advise on procedure or strategy. That is a very useful exercise, but mock arbitration is different and should elicit different but still important information.

First, the social science consultant will try to find an arbitrator or arbitrators that match as closely as possible the characteristics and background of the real arbitrators. This in and of itself, knowing what we know now about psychology, makes the exercise infinitely more useful. In addition, conducted with the assistance of a social scientist, the exercise will not suffer from what is known as the “good subject” response or from confirmation bias which reduces the ability of the colleague or retained specialist to view the presentation with truly unbiased eyes.\textsuperscript{111} Rather, the independent mock arbitrators will evaluate themes and facts without knowing which party the counsel presenting before it is representing in real life, since ideally both sides will be presented by that firm with equal effort.

These mock arbitrators can provide a road map on such matters as how to refine or revise the theme developed to tell the story more sympathetically for the selected arbitrators, which legal theories to emphasize, whether particular kinds of graphics would be helpful and what kind of expert explanations would be most useful. Recalibration of the case based on these insights should result in a more persuasive presentation to the arbitrators actually sitting in the case.\textsuperscript{112}

[C] Enhanced Arbitrator Interviews

There is general approval of interviews of prospective arbitrators in the arbitral community with only 12% of the respondents to the 2012 Queen Mary and White &

\textsuperscript{109} See also Peter L. Michaelson, Enhancing Arbitrator Selection: Using Personality Screening to Supplement Conventional Selection Criteria for Tripartite Arbitration Tribunals, 76 A.B.A. 98 (2010) (urging psychological personality screening in the selection of three arbitrators to maximize the likelihood of their compatibility and so as to contribute to an efficient and high quality arbitral process).

\textsuperscript{110} Anthony & Weinstein, supra note 107.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. at 18.

\textsuperscript{112} Stephen Tuholski, Mock Arbitrations Getting the Most Value for Your Project, 5(2) N.Y. Disp. Res. Law. 20–23 (2012) (providing guidance on how to structure a mock arbitration process); Edna Sussman, Improving your Arbitration Presentation with a Mock Arbitration: Two Case Studies, 5(2) N.Y. Disp. Res. Law. 15–18 (2012) (providing details of two actual mock arbitrations); Anthony & Weinstein, supra note 107 (providing background on the development of mock arbitrations and explaining the role of the consultant).
Case International Arbitration Survey considering them inappropriate. However, there was lack of agreement as to precisely what kinds of questions were permissible.

To assure an independent and impartial tribunal it is generally agreed that areas of permissible inquiry should be restricted. Guideline 7 of the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration provides the most recent guidance on this issue. It permits a party representative to communicate with a prospective party-nominated arbitrator to determine “his or her expertise, experience, ability, availability, willingness and the existence of potential conflicts of interest.” The comments to Guideline 7 explicitly bar “seeking the views of the prospective arbitrator on the substance of the dispute,” but state that inquiries can be made as to “any activities … that may raise justifiable doubts as to the prospective Arbitrator’s independence or impartiality” and with respect to “the general conduct of the proceedings.”

With what we know now about arbitrators and psychology, how should these permissible areas be construed? Can we and should we now ask questions tailored to the dispute to flush out psychological drivers.

In the 2012 Queen Mary/White & Case Survey, 84% of the respondents believed that asking questions about the candidate’s position on legal questions relevant to the case was not appropriate. However, only 64% felt that it was not appropriate to ask if the candidate was a strict constructionist or influenced by the equities; 59% felt it was inappropriate to ask for prior views expressed as an expert or arbitrator on a particular legal issue; 30% felt it was inappropriate to ask about attitudes towards particular procedures such as evidence by videoconference or bifurcation; and only 10% believed it was inappropriate to ask about experience and knowledge of a particular legal topic, technical environment or industry.

Based on the Queen Mary/White & Case survey it would appear that 70% of the arbitral community believes that questions related to matters of procedure, similar to the IBA guidelines permitting questions relating to the conduct of the proceedings, are appropriate. There are numerous questions that can be asked about procedure that could serve as an inquiry into, and in fact may likely prompt, the utilization of debiasing techniques. But is the danger too great that an expanded interview on procedural issues will be used to gain advantages that will influence the merits?

Little thought has been given to the nature of the questions about the candidate’s personal history that might be appropriate. Ninety per cent of the respondents believed that it is appropriate to ask about past experience and knowledge. While it has not been

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114. For a collection and discussion of sources on the subject see Guigi Carmanati, A Review of the Principles Governing Arbitrator Pre-Selection Interviews, in American Bar Association, 1(1) INTL. ARB. COMM. NEWSL., supra note 98, at 14 (guidelines and commentators have suggested strict limiting protocols for arbitrator interviews).
common to consider that question as relating to personal experiences as opposed to professional ones, should there be a difference? Would such questions be viewed as perfectly permissible, much as they would likely be if asked of a potential juror, or would they be viewed as subtly intimating and inquiring into views on the merits.\footnote{Joe Matthews, Identifying and Overcoming Arbitrator Bias – Advocacy in International Arbitration, 5(4) TRANSNATL. DISP. MGT. 1, pp. 15–16 (2008) (asking if expanded interviews “may be a proper and essential part of advocacy in international arbitration conducted in the 21st Century”).}

Should we be concerned that an expansion of the permissible scope of an arbitrator’s interview would create precisely the prejudice that the strictures on such interviews were intended to prevent? It might be argued that allowing an expansion of permissible questions would open a Pandora’s Box and counsel could easily find themselves, even inadvertently, contaminating the neutrality of the prospective arbitrator. However, in the wake of the new information about psychology and the arbitrator, a more detailed discussion of what should or should not be permissible in an arbitrator interview and the development of standardized acceptable questions may be inevitable.\footnote{Jeffery P. Aiken, Due Diligence in Arbitrator Selection: Using Interviews and Written “Voir Dire,” 64 DISP. RES. J. 28 (May/June 2009) (urging more thorough interviews of arbitrators).}

In an administered arbitration, the interview can be conducted in a way that circumvents the potential problems. The AAA and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) have a vehicle to enable such inquiries with its Enhanced Neutral Selection Process for Large Complex Cases.\footnote{American Arbitration Association, Enhanced Neutral Selection Process for Large Complex Cases, available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003909.} Parties can develop questions, which after review and approval by the institution, are presented to prospective arbitrators for response to all parties either in writing or on a telephone conference. The arbitrator has the option of responding or declining the invitation to respond to any or all questions. The process works very well and can provide information that no amount of web research or calls to colleagues at other firms could uncover.

Consideration might also be given to a joint interview of a prospective chair with all parties participating to make the inquiries relevant to the case to assure the selection of a chair with the least prejudicial attitudinal blinders and a practice which strives to overcome informational and cognitive blinders.

§3.06 CONCLUSION

While legal principles and precedents provide a constraint and impose some rigor on decision-making by arbitrators, subconscious factors that inevitably influence every person also play a significant role. Many arbitrators already take steps to assure a sound award but, with the current recognition of the impact of psychological influences, a reexamination of best practices in arbitrator decision-making is in order.

There are concrete debiasing steps that arbitrators can take to improve the quality of their decisions and to assure a more impartial result. Time and cost considerations must always be taken into account in deciding which additional steps to take.
However, many of the steps that are suggested here for consideration do not take any more time or cost any more money.

A party’s selection of an arbitrator most likely to come into the arbitration with unconscious predilections favorable to that party’s position can be an important factor in maximizing the chances of winning. Similarly, counsel’s framing of the dispute and the theme developed to tell the story to evoke a positive response from the arbitrators is known by all to be essential to a persuasive presentation. But more can be done to enhance the arbitrator selection process and to tailor the presentation to the particular arbitrators selected. Whether the additional steps suggested for consideration are cost justified in a particular case must be considered. With the significant dollar values now often seen in arbitration cases, additional effort to factor psychological influences into the selection of the arbitrator and into the case presentation may be desirable.